Michael Young: A new chapter in Syria's fortunes?

A new chapter in Syria's fortunes?
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, February 15, 2007

The two bus attacks near Bikfaya on Tuesday morning were the latest demonstrations of how far opponents of the Hariri tribunal are willing to go to prevent its establishment. However, on this the second anniversary of Rafik Hariri's death, it is becoming apparent that Syrian intransigence may be leading toward an unintended consequence: passage of the tribunal under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

None of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is enthusiastic about going to Chapter VII. Creating a court under its authority would take time, it could substantially alter the nature of Lebanese participation in the judicial process, and it would set a precedent that few if any of the permanent five is likely to be happy with. However, with Syrian officials bluntly declaring their opposition to the tribunal before various interlocutors, including Turkish Prime Minister Reccep Tayyip Erdogan, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the Iranians, the Russians, and, on Tuesday, Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, we are nearing the stage where the international community's credibility will be at stake.

Damascus is precipitating a crisis it could have avoided. One year ago, a senior March 14 politician who had just returned from Saudi Arabia told me the regime there was reluctant to move ahead on the tribunal. Since then, the mood in the kingdom has changed completely. As Syria built up its ties with Iran in the past year, as it began destabilizing the situation in Lebanon, the tribunal became a valuable stick to use against Bashar Assad. The Syrian president has squandered one opportunity after another to dig himself out of the quicksand provoked by Rafik Hariri's assassination. He now finds himself being sucked deeper into it.

Assad would do well not to rely too heavily on the Russians. There is nothing Moscow would like more than for the tribunal to vanish, as it fears the consequences of the Syrian backlash. Russia will cry murder before it agrees to Chapter VII. However, several informed sources believe that if the Security Council moves in that direction, if Syria leaves the international community with no alternative, then the Russians will not thwart the procedure. As one person put it: "At the end of the day, if there is agreement at the top level, I doubt this is where Russia would seek a confrontation through the use of a veto. It's not in its national interest."

What will happen in the coming months is that all sides will continue to give priority to a Lebanese solution. At the same time, deliberations over resorting to Chapter VII will gain momentum if the tribunal remains stalled in Lebanon. The permanent members of the Security Council are not yet there. However, as the source put it, "there have been informal discussions. The word 'Chapter VII' is now being used."

There has been some talk of amending the tribunal's statutes as a way out of the deadlock, particularly Article 3, paragraph 2, defining responsibility for Hariri's murder. The passage states that "a superior shall be criminally responsible for any of the crimes [being investigated] committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates ..." The Syrians have said that this poses a major problem for them. Under such terms, Syria's top leadership could be held accountable.

Yet even respected crisis-management organizations, such as the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, have misread the implications of Syria's uneasiness. In its latest report on Lebanon, for example, the ICG proposed "a revision of Article 3.2 of the tribunal's statutes to clarify - and narrow - the presently very broadly defined circumstances under which a superior can be held responsible for crimes committed by a subordinate."

However, those advocating this measure fail to see that the Assad regime has already shown that it doesn't think amending Article 3.2 is enough. By rejecting all concessions; by refusing to offer Lebanon any guarantees for its sovereignty or the security of its politicians; by blocking a comprehensive quid pro quo on the tribunal - when leading figures in the March 14 coalition would probably be willing to arrive at one - Syria has all but admitted that altering the tribunal's statutes is secondary. Syrian leaders seem to believe that in a system as rigidly hierarchical as theirs, it would be impossible to limit responsibility to the lower rungs of decision-making when it comes to Hariri's assassination. In that context, everything becomes a zero-sum game: Either the tribunal is scuttled, or Syria's regime goes down. This rigid reading, however, is preventing Assad from considering median solutions that may still be feasible, but that would also involve his making substantial concessions in Lebanon.

The Syrians can continue to hold Lebanese political life hostage to their obstinacy. However, this is damaging Syria's closest allies. In Lebanon, Hizbullah and Amal have paid a high price in the last two months for a Syrian-induced standoff that has taken the country to the brink of sectarian warfare. Iran, which has adopted the Syrian position on the tribunal and won't readily dump its alliance with Damascus, does not want to see its complex array of Middle Eastern calculations overcome by the single issue of the tribunal. Russia is little inclined to expend political capital protecting Syria at the UN, particularly against a tribunal that it helped create. Sooner or later Syria must give something up in order to gain something in exchange. Otherwise, it may find itself all alone.

Syria's mistake is to assume that the international community will just abandon the Hariri tribunal. The Syrians are imposing a fight on the UN - one which the organization has little desire to engage in, but even less of a willingness to lose. Assad lost the fight he picked over Resolution 1559; his regime's chances of winning this one are rapidly diminishing.